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  <title>The Geopolitical Economist · Yemen</title>
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  <description>Articles on Yemen.</description>
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  
  <item>
    <title>The Sandals Gatekeepers: How a Houthi–Horn Axis Could Redraw Red Sea Power</title>
    <link>https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/sandals-gatekeepers-houthi-horn-axis-red-sea</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 01 Oct 2026 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Frank Genin</dc:creator>
    <description>In September the Houthis stopped being an insurgency and became a landlord. With al Shabaab on the opposite shore, the Red Sea faces a dual chokepoint squeeze.</description>
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    <content:encoded><![CDATA[New analysis on The Geopolitical Economist

The Sandals Gatekeepers: How a Houthi–Horn Axis Could Redraw Red Sea Power

The Houthis hold the Bab el Mandeb islands and a partner on the Somali shore. Three scenarios for a Red Sea toll regime.

In September the Houthis stopped being an insurgency and became a landlord. With al Shabaab on the opposite shore, the Red Sea faces a dual chokepoint squeeze.

From the opening:
“In the first half of September 2026, Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis stopped being an insurgency and became a landlord. A short, fast offensive handed them the entire western Red Sea coastline, the port of Mokha, and the islands that sit inside the Bab el Mandeb: Perim, Zuqar, the Greater and Lesser Hanish.”

By Frank Genin, Geopolitical analyst and board strategy adviser; editor, Geopolitics Sunday Brief

Read the full analysis: https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/sandals-gatekeepers-houthi-horn-axis-red-sea

#Geopolitics #MiddleEast #Africa #GlobalEconomy]]></content:encoded>
    <category>Middle East &amp; North Africa</category>
    <category>Africa</category>
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    <title>The Middle East’s New Firestorm: The Houthis, Saudi Arabia and the First Test of the Makkah Pact</title>
    <link>https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/makkah-pact-houthis-saudi-arabia-first-test</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Hafijul Rahman</dc:creator>
    <description>The pact&#x27;s most important test may not be whether Pakistan and Türkiye enter the Yemen war, but whether the three countries can strengthen Saudi Arabia&#x27;s defence while preventing the conflict from widening.</description>
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    <content:encoded><![CDATA[New analysis on The Geopolitical Economist

The Middle East’s New Firestorm: The Houthis, Saudi Arabia and the First Test of the Makkah Pact

The Houthis warn Pakistan and Türkiye off Yemen. The pact's real test is containing the war, not widening it.

The pact's most important test may not be whether Pakistan and Türkiye enter the Yemen war, but whether the three countries can strengthen Saudi Arabia's defence while preventing the conflict from widening.

From the opening:
“The Middle East is once again facing a dangerous escalation. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi movement has intensified, while the newly signed Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye is facing its first major test.”

By Hafijul Rahman, Freelance journalist, Bangladesh

Read the full analysis: https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/makkah-pact-houthis-saudi-arabia-first-test

#Geopolitics #MiddleEast #Pakistan #SaudiArabia #Yemen #Türkiye]]></content:encoded>
    <category>Middle East &amp; North Africa</category>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>Egypt Didn&#x27;t Fix Its Foreign Currency Problem. It Rented a Solution.</title>
    <link>https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/egypt-ras-el-hekma-suez-foreign-currency</link>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Camilo Flora Matsumbo</dc:creator>
    <description>The $35 billion Ras El-Hekma deal with the UAE, not structural reform alone, most immediately eased Egypt&#x27;s foreign-exchange crisis, arriving just as Houthi attacks collapsed Suez Canal revenue.</description>
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    <content:encoded><![CDATA[New analysis on The Geopolitical Economist

EGYPT DIDN'T FIX ITS FOREIGN CURRENCY PROBLEM. IT RENTED A SOLUTION.

A $35bn land deal eased Egypt's currency crisis just as Suez revenue collapsed. Has its capacity to earn dollars recovered?

The $35 billion Ras El-Hekma deal with the UAE, not structural reform alone, most immediately eased Egypt's foreign-exchange crisis, arriving just as Houthi attacks collapsed Suez Canal revenue.

From the opening:
“Egypt's economic improvement since 2024, reflected in faster growth, sharply lower inflation and rebuilt reserves, is often described as the payoff from a hard, IMF-backed reform program. Much of that improvement reflects genuine adjustment and reform.”

By Camilo Flora Matsumbo, Researcher and economic analyst, Mozambique

Read the full analysis: https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/egypt-ras-el-hekma-suez-foreign-currency

#Geopolitics #Africa #MiddleEast #Egypt #UAE #Suez]]></content:encoded>
    <category>Africa</category>
    <category>Middle East &amp; North Africa</category>
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    <title>Beyond Hormuz: How Saudi Arabia&#x27;s Oil-Route Redundancy Is Being Tested</title>
    <link>https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/beyond-hormuz-saudi-oil-route-redundancy</link>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
    <dc:creator>Seif A. Harrasy</dc:creator>
    <description>The East-West pipeline gives Saudi Arabia an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, but when one route fails, the remaining routes can become new points of vulnerability.</description>
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    <content:encoded><![CDATA[New analysis on The Geopolitical Economist

Beyond Hormuz: How Saudi Arabia's Oil-Route Redundancy Is Being Tested

The East-West pipeline, Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are all disrupted at once. Saudi oil-route redundancy is being tested to its limit. By Seif A. Harrasy.

The East-West pipeline gives Saudi Arabia an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, but when one route fails, the remaining routes can become new points of vulnerability.

From the opening:
“Saudi Arabia built the East-West Pipeline during the Iran-Iraq War to reduce its exposure to a single chokepoint, serving as an alternative route to the Strait of Hormuz.”

By Seif A. Harrasy, MENA risk researcher, SOAS University of London

Read the full analysis: https://geopoliticaleconomist.com/articles/beyond-hormuz-saudi-oil-route-redundancy

#Geopolitics #MiddleEast #SaudiArabia #Hormuz #GlobalEconomy]]></content:encoded>
    <category>Middle East &amp; North Africa</category>
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