Over the past few years, we can see that western critical minerals lists have become a kind of industrial scripture. Whether its Washington’s list of 60 or Ottawa’s list of 34 critical minerals, investors, executives and project owners treat the classifications as the product of rigorous technical assessments that identify where the vulnerabilities lie. There is this soothing assumption that somewhere inside the government the numbers have been calculated, the risks have been measured, and the word “critical” has been earned every single time for all the minerals on the critical minerals list, based on a strong technical backbone. However, right in front of the eyes of this industrial blindness, boundaries happen to be surprisingly flexible. Corporate lobbying, pulling the geopolitical strings, backroom corporate advocacies and interagency interventions are some of the very non-technical factors that have been influencing the critical minerals list all the time. The result is a bureaucratic illusion with very real economic consequences. Markets are being directed based on these objective maps of vulnerability while the definition of “critical” is being shaped by a much messier combination of technical assessments, political judgments and commercial interests.
What “critical” is supposed to mean
When a mineral appears on a country’s critical minerals list, it usually means that the government of that country has identified a substantial vulnerability in the supply of that mineral. If a mineral is an essential input for energy generation, defence capability and strategic manufacturing, supply disruption could significantly impair the economy or national security. The United States’ current list of 60 critical minerals is informed by a USGS risk analysis covering more than 400 industries and more than 1,200 supply disruption scenarios. Under the Energy Act of 2020, a mineral qualifies as critical if it is essential to U.S. economic or national security; has a supply chain vulnerable to disruption; and serves an essential manufacturing function whose absence would have significant economic or national security consequences. For a mineral to qualify as critical in Canada, a mineral must have both a threatened supply chain and a reasonable chance of Canadian production and satisfy at least one of three additional strategic criteria: to be essential to economy or national security, to be required for the low carbon/ digital transition or to position Canada as a strategic supplier. Canada's current list contains 34 minerals under this framework.
A signal, not just a description
By emphasising the strategic importance of the critical minerals and building policies around them, governments are not only trying to shape the market but trying to shape economic behaviour of the related sectors as well. According to the Canadian federal government, they publish the critical minerals list “to signal to domestic and international investors where we will focus our efforts.”. Critical minerals policy of each country therefore has an external audience as well as a domestic one. It signals where a government intends to concentrate strategic capacity, attract international capital and develop supply relationships with allies. Designating a mineral as critical, elevates the policy status of that mineral from an ordinary commodity to a valued strategic commodity and relevant to the national interest.
This designation ceases to be merely descriptive when the critical minerals list is incorporated into speeches, funding programs, investment directions, international agreements and industrial plans. Each new policy around critical minerals changes the expectations and strategic actions of the actors outside the government: firms, investors, workers, suppliers, project owners and end users. The resulting changes in investment and industrial activity can, in turn, reinforce political and administrative attention. The reinforced attention could appear as offering grants, tax credits, loan programs, permitting initiatives, infrastructure support, research funding, procurement policies, workforce programs and agreements with allied countries. Such enforced outlook among the industrial and market participants can attract capital, and that capital converts into cumulative sunk commitments such as construction, permitting, supplier development and technical workforce recruitment. This eventually creates a new economic ecosystem that depends on the continuation of an industrial trajectory that governments deliberately initiated at the beginning. Once started, the process is not easily reversible since the ecosystem starts to gain momentum and new physical investment, supplier relationships, specialized labour and follow-on capital make reversal progressively more expensive. A policy signal intended to reduce strategic vulnerability can, therefore, create long term domestic and international commitments.
When commercial advocacy enters the process
By seeing a mineral on a country’s critical minerals list we might automatically assume that based on technical, industrial and economic evaluations, the supply of that mineral has been considered a potential vulnerability, therefore, the government of that country has plans to ensure sustainable access to that mineral by providing dedicated policy attention and support to selected projects. Despite the fact that we believe selecting critical minerals must be merely based on technical, geopolitical and economic matters, the evidence shows the qualification process can be influenced by organized advocacy from actors with direct commercial interests.
Canada: writing yourself onto the list
In Canada, phosphate was not considered “critical” until “First Phosphate” registered a federal lobbying mandate whose stated objective was to “add phosphate to Canada’s list of critical minerals.” Two years later, phosphorus was added to Canada’s critical minerals list in 2024. But that was not enough. In November 2025, First Phosphate submitted a formal brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Natural Resources asking for phosphate to be made eligible for federal critical mineral fiscal measures. Under a section titled “Requests from First Phosphate,” the company specifically asked the committee to recommend adding phosphate to the list of minerals eligible for those incentives and to make phosphate projects eligible for the new $2 billion Sovereign Investment Fund. The company also explained its commercial interest directly, stating that the Clean Technology Manufacturing Investment Tax Credit could help finance its planned phosphoric-acid plant at Port Saguenay and that broader tax eligibility would support its industrial development. In February 2026, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, adopted an amendment to Bill C-15 adding phosphate to the Critical Mineral Exploration Tax Credit. First Phosphate stated that the change would help the company raise capital for exploration and development. The amendment became law when Bill C-15 received Royal Assent on March 26, 2026.
Parallel to First Phosphate, “Champion Iron” had been lobbying to the federal government of Canada since 2022 to promote the strategic importance of its high purity iron concentrate and to encourage government to invest in iron processing. By having direct communications with senior officials responsible for Canada’s critical minerals policy, including NRCan’s Executive Director for Critical Minerals and Director of Critical Minerals, in June 2024, high purity iron became one of the only three new minerals added to Canada’s critical minerals list.
When the technical case disappears but the mineral stays
Based on what was previously mentioned about how Canada’s critical minerals list is intended to guide federal policy and programs and signal areas of government priority to stakeholders, the situation becomes more complicated when a mineral no longer appears to need the current level of concern, yet the government still preserves that mineral on the critical minerals list.
Under the USGS 2025 methodology, a mineral normally cleared the quantitative screen if its probability weighted economic damage from disruption exceeded $2 million, putting it at least in the “moderate” risk category. If it failed that test, it could still qualify through the second test: a single domestic producer creating a single point of failure. Arsenic failed both, in the United States. Its modeled economy-wide impact was only about $2 million, putting it in the lower “limited” category rather than above the inclusion threshold. But the United States was still 100% net-import reliant for arsenic, and USGS estimated that imports from China supplied about 52% of U.S. consumption over 2020–23. USGS claimed revised production data showed Peru, and not China, was the world's leading arsenic producer, lowering one aspect of concentration risk. Although the USGS technical assessment recommended removing arsenic from the critical minerals list, the Department of Defense supported continued inclusion during the interagency review given the importance of arsenic for military systems. Department of Defense’s intervention contributed to arsenic remaining on the final list despite the USGS recommendation for removal. In another example, tellurium, a major copper operation in Utah successfully achieved the copper-telluride recovery capability, taking the United States from more than 95% net-import reliance in 2021 to net-exporter status in 2023. That sharply reduced the modeled risk of a foreign trade disruption. USGS recommended taking tellurium off the critical list but again, Department of Defense supported keeping tellurium on the final list because of its military applications, and thus it was retained for another cycle of refreshed data and modeling.
The EU: strategic today, critical automatically
The story with critical minerals lists gets even more complicated when governments make a second category of strategic priority alongside the criticality assessment. Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act, EU identifies 34 “Critical Raw Materials”, and “17 Strategic Raw Materials”. These two categories are assessed separately and all the minerals that qualify as strategic are automatically included in the critical raw materials list. Based on the European Commission’s description, the strategic group contains the materials considered most crucial to the technologies used in the green, digital, defense, and aerospace sectors. Also, the 2030 capacity benchmarks for extraction, processing, recycling and import diversification are attached specifically to the strategic category. But EU presents a strange example. Copper and nickel did not meet the normal thresholds required to qualify as critical raw materials because their supply was considered sufficiently diversified and their measured supply risk was too low. In November 2022, the European Copper Institute, representing the European copper industry, asked the Commission to designate copper as a strategic raw material, while Schneider Electric had separately also requested for the strategic raw materials list to include copper, nickel and manganese.
The Commission subsequently designated copper and battery-grade nickel as strategic minerals because of their crucial role in strategic industries. The Nickel Institute later acknowledged that nickel had failed the normal criticality assessment but argued that the strategic status of nickel should be expanded from battery grade nickel to nickel more generally. Because under the Critical Raw Materials Act, every strategic raw material is automatically included in the critical raw materials list, copper and battery grade nickel became legally critical despite failing the ordinary criticality test. The question is not whether Europe should anticipate future supply problems or monitor the changing conditions, but why a mineral that fails the criticality test should automatically become critical through a different classification.
A second tier, and a second opening for influence
Canada’s framework also recognizes six priority minerals out of the 34 on its critical minerals list given their distinct potential to spur economic growth and their necessity as inputs for priority supply chains. The first list is justified by the necessity of having secure access or production capability for industrial or national security purposes. For the second list, they apply a second filter using different criteria, but much of the strategic rationale overlaps with the rationale already used to justify criticality. The question here becomes if the first group was already declared critical for many logical reasons, what exactly has changed when a subset becomes “strategic” or “priority”? More importantly, if the second filtering is being applied to concentrate greater government attention and support on a narrower group of minerals, what would guarantee that commercial interest of industrial actors is not already influencing that second classification?
Australia’s nickel U-turn
Australia uses the terms “critical’ and “strategic” in a different way. A mineral is placed on the Strategic Materials List if it is strategically important, but its supply chain is not considered vulnerable enough to meet the criteria for the Critical Minerals List, which is a list of minerals that their supply chain is exposed to disruption. In Australia, industry groups had already pushed for nickel to be added to the critical minerals list before the government’s December 2023 update, yet the government placed nickel on the newly created strategic materials list instead. Within a few weeks, six operating nickel facilities announced production reduction or went into care and maintenance amid deteriorating market conditions. On February 16, 2024, the Minister of Resources stated circumstances had materially changed since December and added nickel to the critical minerals list, citing the pressure on domestic capacity and changing market conditions. The addition immediately made nickel companies eligible to seek financing through the $4 billion Critical Minerals Facility and relevant grant programs. This clearly shows how critical status can have tangible financial and policy consequences, giving industries a rational incentive to seek inclusion and resist exclusion.
A competition for status, not just security
Critical minerals list does not merely describe vulnerability. It establishes access to a hierarchy of economic advantages. Once governments introduce a list of the minerals they prioritize and the tax credits and finite competitive funds they have dedicate to the minerals on that list, project owners of different minerals start to compete not only for receiving the “critical” designation, but also for a better position inside government classifications. The classification itself can change the market it is supposed to assess by attracting capital and industrial activity. Each new ecosystem that is focused on one or a narrow selection of the minerals will require continues government support to keep the system functioning. In long run, this might cause for government support to lose its focus and deprive the projects that need government support and attention from receiving it.
How to make “critical” mean something again
To solve this problem, we should start at the very first place of how the critical minerals list is created. The critical status must remain a technical, economic and scientific assessment and not simply a policy preference. If lobbying, industrial ambition, future opportunity or political interference can substitute for the technical reason of vulnerability, the critical minerals list will breach its own purpose and becomes misleading. Governments should therefore publish a clear assessment for every mineral explaining the vulnerability, why is it serious enough to justify “critical” status, and what evidence supports that conclusion. This mindset automatically makes an important distinction between a mineral that is literally critical and a mineral that merely requires to be monitored. If a government believes a mineral may become strategically important in the future, but its current status does not qualify for “critical” designation, that mineral should not be on the critical minerals list. Instead, governments can publish watch lists, outlooks or future investment signals separately. Otherwise, the critical minerals list becomes a container of all the minerals that might matter someday which destroys its usefulness and accuracy. At last, the critical minerals list needs an internal hierarchy. “Critical” cannot reasonably imply that 30, 40 or 60 minerals require the same urgency or government support. The list must disclose a spectrum of urgency and details about the government support plans and offers. A government that cannot distinguish between what is important, what may become vulnerable and what is already vulnerable enough to justify intervention, risks turning a strategic tool into a political and commercial tool. Criticality should be hard to earn, clear to explain and possible to lose.
Kiana Kianara is Executive Vice President, Marketing and PR, at CVMR Corporation, an international mining and refining company. Her work focuses on critical mineral supply chains, refining capabilities, industrial policy, and their broader geopolitical implications.
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- First Phosphate, brief to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Natural Resources, November 2025 (PDF).
- First Phosphate, critical minerals and clean-tech tax-credit statement.
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- Australian Minister for Resources, Nickel placed on the Critical Minerals List, 16 February 2024.


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