Abstract

Scholars agree that the liberal international order is breaking apart but disagree about what is breaking, when the breakdown began, and what will replace it. Reading the leading accounts as descriptions of four supports of one order, this article argues that the order is in terminal decline, in that its American-led configuration cannot be restored, but that the decline has neither a single cause nor a single date. Because power and legitimacy now sit with different actors, the transition will be long, and its outcome may turn on how the leaders of rising powers understand the order they inherit.

Keywords: liberal international order; interregnum; multiplex world; multipolarity; legitimacy; great-power politics; leaders

Introduction

For more than seven decades, on the most common account, the world has lived under a liberal international order: an open world economy, multilateral institutions, American alliances, and rules presented as universal (Ikenberry, 2018). Today its breakdown is visible; what will replace it is not. The world is caught between two historical phases, one collapsing in front of our eyes and the other not yet formed.

This article asks three questions. What does it mean to say that the order is breaking apart? When did the breakdown begin, and how long will the transition take? And what is emerging in its place? The answers matter practically, because governments must decide whether to prepare for great-power rivalry or for a plural world of regions and shared rules, and theoretically, because realists, Global IR scholars and liberal institutionalists each predicted a different ending and each now claims to see it.

I argue that the order is in terminal decline, but that its decline has neither a single cause nor a single date. The principal accounts describe four supports of one order, each failing at its own pace. The economic shifts of the 1970s opened the cracks, the financial crisis of 2008 widened them, and the backlash of 2016 made the decline irreversible by turning the order’s own architect against it. The transition will take decades, because no state holds both the power and the legitimacy needed to impose new rules, and the present supports the realist and the ‘multiplex’ forecasts at once. What comes next cannot yet be known, and may turn on a variable all four accounts neglect: the leaders of rising powers.

What Does It Mean to Say the Order Is Breaking Apart?

For Mearsheimer (2019), even the order’s age is in dispute: the Western order of the Cold War was ‘neither liberal nor international’ but ‘realist in all its key dimensions’ (p. 8). A liberal international order appeared only after 1991, when unipolarity allowed the United States to pursue liberal hegemony, and it ‘contained the seeds of its own destruction’ (p. 7). Democracy promotion provoked nationalism, and hyperglobalisation eroded support at home while helping China end unipolarity. Its breaking apart means the end of unipolar dominance and a return to raw power politics.

For Acharya (2014, 2018), what is ending is not material power but a Western monopoly on ideas and rule-making. For decades the West dictated the rules of sovereignty, security and trade; now the ‘Rest’, non-Western states such as India and China, no longer accept those rules passively. They assert their own agency, bring their own historical concepts to the making of order, and demand a decentralised world.

Druzin (2024) locates the break in the institutions themselves. The IMF, the WTO and the dollar system looked strong because states were locked into them ‘simply because they are the only game in town’ (p. 5). Such a ‘brittle order’ (p. 5) can last for decades and then collapse quickly once a rival appears, and, he warns, containing China, by forcing it to build parallel institutions, would hasten exactly that.

A fourth reading treats the breakdown as a crisis of legitimacy. For Kissinger (2014), any order rests on ‘commonly accepted rules’ and ‘a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down’ (p. 9), and it must be accepted as just by citizens as well as leaders. The liberal order is breaking because its legitimacy is no longer accepted by many of the states, and now many of the publics, that live under it.

These four answers are not simply rivals. Each author tracks a different force, military, ideational, institutional or moral, and each sees it failing. Read together, they describe an order losing its power, its monopoly on ideas, its lock-in and its legitimacy at once.

Two Objections

The claim of decline faces objections from opposite directions. Institutionalists concede that American hegemonic leadership is weakening but hold that liberal internationalism runs ‘deep in world politics’ (Ikenberry, 2018, p. 8), its troubles a ‘crisis of success’ (p. 10). Börzel and Zürn (2021) likewise trace contestation to ‘a rise in liberal authority that set in after 1989’ (p. 282). Critics, by contrast, doubt there was ever an order to lose: Acharya (2017) calls it ‘a limited international order, rather than an inclusive global order’ (p. 271), and Porter (2020) treats it as a nostalgic myth that conceals the coercion on which American ordering rested.

Both objections sharpen the thesis rather than defeat it. What is ending is neither liberal internationalism as a body of ideas nor a golden age that never existed, but a configuration: universal rules written in the West and underwritten by American preponderance. If contestation is produced by the order’s own expansion, better management cannot reverse it; if the order was always narrower than its claims, rising powers are rejecting something they never fully joined. The institutionalist case needs an actor both willing and able to defend the configuration. After 2016, that is precisely what is missing.

When Did the Breakdown Begin?

Dating the breakdown divides these authors too. Economic accounts find the first cracks in the 1970s. The end of fixed exchange rates did not itself destroy embedded liberalism, the post-war compromise between open markets and domestic social protection; Ruggie (1982) read that decade’s changes as adjustments within the compromise. But the deregulation and open capital markets that followed detached the open economy from its social bargain, producing what Ikenberry (2018) calls a ‘Polanyi crisis’ (p. 10). The financial crisis of 2008 widened the cracks, discrediting the Western economic model just as China’s state-led growth seemed to vindicate an alternative.

Acharya effectively dates the breakdown to the order’s birth: as decolonisation roughly tripled UN membership between 1945 and 1980, the new states resisted Western dominance, built regional institutions and refused superpower alliances (Acharya, 2014, 2018). Mearsheimer dates it later still, to the end of unipolarity ‘in or close to 2016’ (Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 8).

In 2016 the order’s principal architect began to dismantle it. Brexit and the election of Donald Trump signalled a domestic backlash against globalisation at the core of the order, and when the United States withdrew from treaties, launched trade wars and embraced ‘America First’ nationalism, the decline became irreversible. Acharya (2017) treats Trump as ‘a consequence—not a cause—of the decline of the liberal order’ (p. 272). But a consequence can still be decisive: 2016 turned the one power that might have defended the order into its leading critic.

These dates record different losses. Acharya’s describes a condition the order lived with for decades, and Mearsheimer’s sees only the shift in power that 2016 made visible. The 1970s, 2008 and 2016 mark the loss of things the order has not recovered: its social bargain, the credibility of its economic model, and the willingness of its hegemon. An order that loses its supports one at a time does not fall. It subsides.

How Long Will the Transition Take?

We are living in an interregnum in Gramsci’s sense: ‘the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 276). The two great transitions of the twentieth century had dates, 1945 and 1991; the decline of American hegemony is gradual and grinding. The United States remains the largest military and economic power, while China and India face serious domestic constraints and cannot yet overturn the order (Acharya, 2017, p. 272).

No state holds both the power and the legitimacy to impose new rules, and history suggests why this matters. In Gilpin’s (1981) account, hegemonic transitions were resolved by hegemonic war, which settled both the distribution of power and the rules that followed. Nuclear deterrence and interdependence make such a resolution far less likely. The paradox is that what makes this transition less likely to be catastrophic also makes it longer: without a decisive war, the rules must be negotiated, which may take decades.

What Comes Next?

The scholarship offers two pictures of the future. Acharya’s ‘multiplex world’ is hopeful: like ‘a multiplex cinema’ (Acharya, 2017, p. 277), it shows many films under one roof, with no dominant power, influential non-state actors (Nye, 2011), and regional bodies such as the African Union and ASEAN managing their own affairs. Realists expect worse. As China rises it will seek to dominate Asia and the United States will try to stop it, producing what Mearsheimer (2001, chap. 9) calls unbalanced multipolarity, the most war-prone distribution of power; for order, he expects ‘a thin international order and two thick bounded orders’, led by China and the United States (Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 44). The danger has a name, Thucydides’s Trap (Allison, 2017), and Xi Jinping invoked it during Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing in May 2026 (Davis, 2026).

The forecasts can be told apart by what they expect of rising powers: exit and rival institutions, or continued membership with regional complements. The record supports neither cleanly. China built the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative while remaining inside the WTO; India left the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership talks in 2019 while raising the Quad to leaders’ level; and the BRICS states promote local-currency settlement yet call their payments initiative ‘voluntary and non-binding’ (BRICS, 2024, para. 65).

Meanwhile Gramsci’s morbid symptoms are visible. Gaines (2023) models how a weakened order narrows the bargaining space between states and makes conflict more likely. The war in Ukraine, read by realists as a contest over spheres of influence (Mearsheimer, 2014) and by others as conquest, has returned great-power rivalry to Europe, in what many see as a proxy contest between the United States and Russia. The United States and China compete over trade and technology yet keep cooperating; the 2025 Israel–Iran war displayed the regional disorder that Kissinger (2014) describes; and the order’s financial base is, as Druzin (2024) warns, brittle, with US gross national debt passing US$40 trillion in August 2026 (Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, 2026). Neither forecast is confirmed: the evidence points in different directions on different supports, which is what an interregnum looks like.

Who Reads the Interregnum?

All four accounts assume that states respond to the breakdown according to their position. The two largest rising states belie it. India and China entered the post-1991 order from broadly similar positions and moved apart: India toward defending a rules-based order it had once contested, China toward building alternatives to an order from which it had gained most, its sharpest turn arguably coming at the leadership transition of 2012–13 rather than at any threshold of power. The neglected variable is how leaders understand the order they inherit. Role theory treats transitional orders as ‘the liminal space between one order and the next’ (Beasley et al., 2026, p. 1), and operational code analysis has measured Chinese leaders’ beliefs (He & Feng, 2013), but Indian prime ministers’ beliefs have not been systematically measured. Whether the interregnum ends in rival bounded orders or a multiplex world may depend on them.

Conclusion

The liberal international order is breaking apart in the sense defined here: its American-led configuration cannot be restored. Because power and legitimacy now sit with different actors, and hegemonic war is unlikely to settle the question, the interregnum will be long. No single school can explain an outcome that is a power shift, an ideational challenge, an institutional fracture and a crisis of legitimacy at once. Until the major powers forge a shared consensus, the world will remain in an interregnum defined not by peace or cooperation but by uncertainty about the rules of a world struggling to be reborn.

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